

Islam Assembled

The Advent of the Muslim Congresses



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THIRTEEN

CONGRESSES OF COLLABORATION

*Islam and the Axis,
1938–1945*

“**F**OR THE PRESENT, every Moslem nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of republics.” So admonished Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Indian Muslim poet, philosopher, and a participant in the 1931 Jerusalem Muslim congress.¹ None could challenge Iqbal’s commitment to the cause of independence for all Muslim peoples. He still maintained that Islam “recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizons of its members.” But a sinking into “deeper self” was essential if the various parts of the whole were to gain or preserve independence from foreign rule, and then garner strength.²

One of the aims of Muslim activists through their congresses had been to deny legitimacy to the division of Muslim lands by foreigners, and to affirm that Muslims alone would define the scale of their allegiances. Now Iqbal argued that it was pointless to resist this division. Independence still could be won and preserved, but only within the boundaries recognized as legitimate by those foreign powers which decided the destinies of Muslims. Iqbal thus called upon each Muslim people to make a separate calculation, and to go its separate way, if only for a time. His was a denial of a shared Muslim predicament.

Not all Indian Muslims heeded Iqbal’s admonition. As late as October 1938, an Indian Muslim delegation appeared in Cairo, to participate in an Interparliamentary Congress of Arab and Muslim Lands for the Defense of Palestine. This event was the handiwork of Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Alluba, the former treasurer of the Jerusalem Muslim congress, who had participated in Amin al-Husayni’s unsuccessful 1933 fundraising tour through India. ‘Alluba nonetheless invited a delegation of Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah’s All-India Muslim League to Cairo, and that delegation played a major role in what was otherwise an Arab congress,

attended by leading Christian Arab nationalists. Muslims "ought to treat Muslim questions from a Muslim point of view without distinction of nationality," declared the leader of the delegation.³ But seven years earlier it had been sufficient to convene what was formally a Muslim congress on this same issue, restricted to Muslim participants and insistent on the Muslim attachment to Palestine. Now Muhammad ʿAli ʿAlluba did not seek to reconvene that congress, but created an entirely new forum, in which the Arab nationalist emphasis was predominant and the Muslim content ambiguous. His confidence had been shaken in the effectiveness of an exclusively Muslim approach to the defense of Palestine.⁴

This narrowing of allegiance thinned the ranks of the Muslim committed. Then came the choice of leading Muslim activists to side with the Axis powers, and attempts to organize wider Muslim opinion in support of Axis war aims. Disciples of Afghani and heirs of Rashid Rida cast in their lots with the rising forces of totalitarianism, in the conviction that it would rid the Muslim world of two seemingly greater evils, colonialism and imperialism.

Of the warring powers, Japan gave the fullest credit to Muslim allegiances, and made the greatest effort to win them. This determined policy was designed to secure the sympathies of important Muslim populations in regions marked for possible Japanese expansion, in China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands Indies, and British Malaya and India.⁵ To advance these aims, Japanese authorities encouraged the establishment of numerous Muslim societies and institutions throughout the 1930s, not only in Japan, but in Manchukuo and later in occupied China. In 1938, all of these bodies were made subordinate to the Greater Japan Muslim League (*Dai Nippon Kaikyo Kyokai*), under the presidency of Abdürreşid İbrahim[ov], a Siberian-born Volga Tatar.

Abdürreşid İbrahim (1852–1944) was a Muslim activist in the most cosmopolitan tradition. He had traveled extensively in Muslim lands and in Europe, and at various times had joined forces with Abdülhamid II and Afghani. But his particular obsession had been the liberation of Muslims subjected to Russian rule, an aim which he sought to realize through association with Japan. During a period spent in Japan in 1908–9, İbrahim concluded a written pact of Muslim-Japanese cooperation against Russia with Toyama Mitsuru, the influential patron of the expansionist Black Dragon Society. These and similar patriotic societies—with their vision of a Japanese-dominated Asia and their close ties to the political and military elite—provided consistent support for a policy

of embracing Muslim causes.⁶ So too did Japan's growing community of Tatar Muslim refugees who had escaped from Russian rule and revolution, and who soon began to organize themselves.⁷

In 1933, İbrahim left Istanbul to return to Tokyo at the invitation of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, in the midst of renewed Japanese efforts to cultivate Muslim sympathies. He immediately rose to a position of prominence in the local community, which in 1938 celebrated the opening of a great central mosque in Tokyo, in the presence of many visiting Muslim dignitaries from abroad.⁸ That event signaled a doubling of Japanese efforts in the field. Upon the opening of the mosque, a Greater Japan Muslim League was established in Tokyo, under the presidency of a former minister of war and prime minister, who then vacated the position for İbrahim. The purpose of the League was to coordinate the work of the numerous Japanese-inspired Muslim associations, and to inform the wider Muslim world of Japan's determination to defend Muslim interests. The League was a governmental creation, and in its first year of operation, the Japanese Foreign Ministry, Army, and Navy provided ¥100,000 of the League's total budget of ¥112,000.⁹

In November 1939, the new League sponsored an Islamic Exhibition in Tokyo and Osaka, to which it invited Muslims from within Japan's sphere of influence and beyond. The response to this appeal was modest, for the invitations preceded the exhibition by less than two months. From Manchukuo came delegations from Japanese-initiated associations, foremost among them the Manchukuo Muslim Peoples' League, which had been established to unite and thus control the Muslims of the puppet-state.¹⁰ From Japanese-occupied China came representatives of the All China Muslim League, a Peking-based association financed by the Japanese Army.¹¹ But the most celebrated participants arrived from Indonesia, for theirs was the only major delegation from beyond the Japanese sphere. In 1937, the principal Indonesian Muslim organizations—Muhammadijah, Sarekat Islam, and Nadhatul Ulama—formed a federative front, the Madjlis Islam A'laa Indonesia (MIAI). It was the MIAI which dispatched a four-man delegation to Tokyo that included Muhammadijah youth leader and Jerusalem congress delegate Abdul Kahar Muzakkir (1907–1973); student organizer Ahmad Kasmat; and Azhar graduate Farid Ma'ruf.¹²

The exhibition, once opened, thus gathered a cosmopolitan collection of Muslims from the Soviet Union, China, Indonesia, and Japan. The foreign guests were shown evidence of Japan's impressive military and industrial achievements, and learned of Japan's interest in the Muslim cause. The organizers then took advantage of the presence of these delegations, to convene them in a session which the participants audaciously named the First World Muslim Congress. One of the reso-

lutions passed by this unexpected meeting provided for an annual Muslim congress in Tokyo, under the auspices of the Greater Japan Muslim League, a decision made at the explicit request of those government ministries which sponsored the League. The resolutions also called for the publication of a periodical, and officers were elected.¹³ For a power so far removed from the central Muslim lands, Japan's decision to patronize such an organization represented a bold bid, commensurate with its ambitions.

But the spread of war thwarted plans for further congresses. In April 1940, the Greater Japan Muslim League informed its sponsoring government ministries that war conditions in the Near East, Central Asia, Africa, and India made the convening of a second congress impractical. Representatives from Indonesia were particularly hesitant to participate because of the worsening of Japanese-Dutch relations, and the League anticipated that none of them would arrive. This meant that only Muslims from Manchuria and China would attend, and under these circumstances, the purposes of the congress could not be served. The League proposed to postpone the congress, and the authorities concurred.¹⁴ Ibrahim had to rest satisfied with conventional means of propaganda for conveyance of his message to the wider Muslim world, principally by radio broadcasts: "Every Wednesday I address the world of Islam on radio, sometimes in Turkish and sometimes in Arabic."¹⁵

The importance of the first congress lay in the strengthening of ties with Indonesian Muslims, who in 1942 fell under direct Japanese rule. The congress had set an exemplary precedent for the collaboration of Indonesian Muslim activists with Japanese occupation authorities. It was true that the Indonesian Muslim delegates to the congress had told Dutch interrogators on their return that the Japanese had struck them as insincere in their solicitude for Islam.¹⁶ But Abdul Kahar Muzakkir, a delegate, eventually served for a time as head of the Religious Affairs Office in the military occupation administration. The other participants were also notable collaborators. In that respect, the congress had served the purpose of projecting an image of Japan compatible with Indonesian Muslim aspirations.¹⁷ But by the time of Ibrahim's death in 1944, the policy of cultivating Muslim sympathies had yielded few other appreciable results.

Hitler's early statement, *Mein Kampf*, dismissed any German appeal to Muslim sentiment as delusory and dangerous. "The 'Holy War' can produce in our German muttonheads the pleasant thrill that now others are ready to shed their blood for us, because this cowardly speculation has, to speak bluntly, been the silent father of all such hopes—but in

reality it will meet a ghastly end under the fire of English machinegun companies and the hail of explosive bombs."¹⁸ So it was most prudent for the German diplomat Fritz Grobba, in a memorandum on the Arab question written in March 1941, to determine that "the Islamic idea (Holy War) is impracticable under the present grouping of powers. Arab nationality and Islam are not identical. The Arabs to be brought into our plans are fighting not for religious, but for political aims."¹⁹

But Amin al-Husayni arrived in Berlin exile in November 1941, and began to advance his claim to a wider Muslim authority.²⁰ For this was world war, and involved political destinies of Muslims everywhere. Amin al-Husayni's expansive approach received important encouragement from Shakib Arslan, who had played so prominent a role in earlier Muslim congresses. Arslan remained in Switzerland throughout the war, as a result of a Swiss decision not to readmit him if he visited Italy or Germany. But Arslan conducted a continuous correspondence with Amin al-Husayni, relentlessly pressing him to intervene in wider Muslim affairs. In one turbulent letter, Arslan called upon his correspondent to demand independence for the Muslims of the Caucasus: "Perhaps the Germans will tell us that we Arabs should mind our own business, that we should not interfere in non-Arab questions, that we should confine ourselves to our national demands and think of no one but ourselves. It is this view that I want to completely refute. We Arabs are at the vanguard of the Islamic nation which numbers 400 million people worldwide. We are united with this nation by bonds of solidarity and mutual responsibility, from the furthest reaches of China to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean. Our aims and the aims of all Islamic peoples are identical."²¹

In another letter, in which he asked Amin al-Husayni to press Japan to formulate an "Islamic policy," Arslan insisted that "we must work for the general wellbeing of Islam, for the aims of Islam and Arabism are identical."²² In still another letter, appealing to Amin al-Husayni to act on behalf of Bosnian Muslims, Arslan predicted that "the entire Muslim world will learn who Amin al-Husayni is, and what he has done in the service of Islam and the Muslims, wherever and whoever they may be. They will realize that his struggle is not limited to his homeland of Palestine or to the Arab nation. All of Europe will learn that the Muslims are brethren regardless of nationality, and that we do not distinguish between Arab and non-Arab."²³ At the very foundation of "our demands" must be the conviction that "behind the Arab world is the even larger Islamic world, comprising 400 million persons. . . . this Islamic world is completely bound to the Arab world, as the body is to the head." It was the duty of the Arabs to seek the liberation of all Muslims subjected to British, French, Russian, and Dutch rule.²⁴ This

flood of letters stimulated and sanctioned Amin al-Husayni's bid to widen his claims.

In Berlin, Amin al-Husayni put forth a detailed proposal along identical lines. The Muslims, he wrote in a memorandum, were the true friends of Germany, engaged in a common struggle against the Jews, the British, and the Communists. But that cooperation needed more organized expression. First, Amin al-Husayni proposed the creation of a special department for Muslim affairs within the German Foreign Office, responsible for the broad sweep of Muslim concerns from East Asia to West Africa. Second, he proposed the recruitment of an "Islamic army, drawn from among the many North African Muslims resident in France, and from the Muslims of the Balkans and Soviet Russia, to join the struggle alongside the German troops. Better use should also be made of the numerous Muslim prisoners of war than has been made so far, and Muslim emissaries should be dispatched to visit the prisoner camps in an organized fashion." Third, Germany should issue a declaration of true intentions "to the Muslims in general and the Arabs in particular," concerning their future independence. And last, he proposed "an Islamic-Arab congress, to be attended by Muslims residing in Europe. This would constitute a splendid demonstration of Arab and Muslim cooperation with Germany, in which official German statements and speeches can be delivered. These would find a powerful echo and wide dissemination in the Arab and Islamic worlds."²⁵ The last proposal immediately evoked the European Muslim Congress convened in Geneva by Arslan in 1935 (see previous chapter).

But, as in the past, Indian Muslims stood in Amin al-Husayni's way, refusing to recognize what they regarded as his unsubstantiated claim to wider Muslim authority. The Berlin in which Amin al-Husayni now found himself was a city with a lengthy history of Muslim émigré activism, boasting numerous Muslim publications and established Muslim institutions. Foremost among these was the Islamische Gemeinde, a society founded twenty years earlier by Indian Muslims. This association structured Muslim life in Berlin, and directed the administration of Berlin's great central mosque.²⁶ The attitude of the mosque and the association to Amin al-Husayni soon became a source of controversy, for they would not admit the newcomer's claim to primacy.

The German Foreign Office provided Amin al-Husayni with the base from which he made that claim, the Islamische Zentralinstitut. This was a minor association established in 1927, which had been inactive for many years. An Arab circle revived it in September 1941 at the prompting of the German Foreign Office for purposes of propaganda. Amin al-Husayni assumed the leadership of the Islamische Zentralinstitut during his first year in Berlin, and with the approach of the festival of *ʿĪd*

al-Adha in December 1942, led a maneuver to gain control of the central mosque.²⁷

Amin al-Husayni proposed to mark the reestablishment of the Islamische Zentralinstitut during the festival prayers in the central mosque. He argued that this would assure a more political tone in the central mosque's ceremonies, so that they could be broadcast overseas with the same alleged effect as the proceedings of the rival London mosque.²⁸ But one of Amin al-Husayni's secretaries, Mustafa al-Wakil, set forth more expansive claims in a letter to Ernst Woermann, the undersecretary who would decide the issue at the German Foreign Office:

How can it happen, with the presence of His Eminence [Amin al-Husayni] in Germany, where there is only a small number of Moslems, that the responsibility in such religious matters is not referred to His Eminence, while His Eminence is the first authority in religious and other questions concerning Moslems and Arabs, and while His Eminence is president of the All Moslem Conference of which Moslem leaders from the whole world have been members? It is curious to find that it is forgotten here that the natural course is to put the questions of the Moslems in Germany under the high supervision of His Eminence.

Wakil wished that "the orders of the German Foreign Ministry would be clear and decisive," namely, to leave to Amin al-Husayni all authority over the Islamische Zentralinstitut, the Islamische Gemeinde, the mosque, festival prayers, and the *Id al-Adha* celebrations.²⁹ There was no doubt that the officers of the Islamische Zentralinstitut viewed supervision of the upcoming celebrations as a decisive step toward the unification of all Muslim institutions in Berlin under their own auspices.³⁰

These proposals met with stiff opposition from the officers of the Islamische Gemeinde responsible for administration of the mosque, and who were for the most part Indian Muslims. As Woermann noted, they had directed the affairs of the central mosque on their own for many years. Yet now Amin al-Husayni sought to make himself the sole spokesman of all the city's Muslims, without even consulting Subhas Chandra Bose, his Indian opposite in Berlin.³¹ Bose already was resentful of Amin al-Husayni's claim to influence over Indian Muslims, whom Bose maintained were within his own jurisdiction. Once, after Amin al-Husayni had issued an appeal to Indian Muslims, Bose complained to German foreign minister Ribbentrop about the encroachment, and insinuated that Amin al-Husayni's Muslim propaganda constituted "religious imperialism."³² This placed the Islamische Gemeinde and Bose on the same side of an acrimonious dispute between Amin al-Husayni and his principal Arab rival in Berlin, Rashid *Ali* al-Kaylani; so that

when the Islamische Gemeinde sponsored a major gathering to affirm Indian-Arab unity, the invited speakers were Bose and Kaylani.³³ The Islamische Gemeinde had some influential supporters in its resistance to Amin al-Husayni's bid, and Woermann wondered whether the time was ripe for the Islamische Zentralinstitut to attempt to dislodge the Islamische Gemeinde.³⁴

Ultimately, the director of the Islamische Gemeinde allowed that Amin al-Husayni, as an esteemed religious dignitary, might conduct the festival prayers, but this could not constitute a service to mark the reestablishment of the Islamische Zentralinstitut. The compromise meant that the Islamische Gemeinde and the Islamische Zentralinstitut would remain distinct, and that the central mosque would continue to function as it had in the past, under the supervision of its founders.³⁵ The address with which Amin al-Husayni inaugurated the Islamische Zentralinstitut was delivered not in the mosque, but in a hall. There he spoke on the obligatory character of the war against the Allies and Zionism.³⁶ In a letter marking the event, he assured Hitler the friendship, cooperation, and sympathy of the 400 million Muslims throughout the world, in support of the Axis struggle against the Judeo-Bolshevik-Anglo-Saxon alliance.³⁷ But those involved in this episode had learned something of the limits of Amin al-Husayni's influence. Having failed to establish its authority over the Muslim community of Berlin, the Islamische Zentralinstitut did not emerge as an important center of activism, and its functions essentially were restricted to the field of publishing.³⁸

Henceforth, Amin al-Husayni's wider claims remained for the most part unacknowledged by the German Foreign Office. First, there was no German willingness to impose his authority upon those Muslims unprepared to accept it. Second, Germany's future plans for the various Muslim peoples were not uniform. Not only were there restraining obligations to Italy and Japan in the Mediterranean, South, and Southeast Asia; but the Muslim-populated and oil-producing areas of the Soviet Union were slated for German exploitation and possible colonization. A German declaration in favor of Muslim independence everywhere was unthinkable. And while Amin al-Husayni offered to convene a Muslim congress to amplify Muslim support for Germany, he was just as likely to use a gathered assembly to attempt to extract new commitments from his hosts. The congress, then, was undesirable from the German point of view, and the German Foreign Office checked Amin al-Husayni's every attempt to establish his wider Muslim authority. In November 1944, he complained that the German Foreign Office official responsible for his affairs had obstructed the work of the Islamische Zentralinstitut, and:

frequently even demands of me that I desist from addressing appeals to Muslims, even though I am president of the Islamic World Congress, and even though I occupy a leading position in the Islamic world. As against this, however, we see that our common enemy, the English and the Russians, are trying to conduct propaganda in the Islamic world by approaching personalities not competent in Islamic matters, who are but loosely linked with the Islamic world. These they promote to be muftis and place in positions of Muslim leadership. The enemies convene Muslim congresses, establish institutes, publish newspapers and periodicals, and strive by all means to make the desired impact upon the Islamic world.³⁹

These were all possibilities for collaboration—among them a Muslim congress—which the German Foreign Office had thwarted.

But Amin al-Husayni made a far deeper impression upon the SS-Hauptamt and the Ostministerium. Both were responsible for political mobilization and military recruitment of Muslims in German-occupied territories, and offered Amin al-Husayni another opportunity to fill the role of Muslim spiritual leader. It was on behalf of the SS-Hauptamt that he embarked upon a recruitment campaign among Bosnian Muslims in 1943, a success which owed much to ties forged in earlier Muslim congresses with leaders of the Bosnian Muslim community.⁴⁰ He also visited Turkic Muslim prisoners of war who were being recruited in large numbers to SS ranks, and helped to found a school for Turkic Muslim SS chaplains in Dresden in 1944, where he preached his doctrine of Muslim solidarity.⁴¹ At the same time, Amin al-Husayni conducted his own private diplomacy, invoking his authority as president of the Muslim congress established in Jerusalem over a decade earlier. In the boldest of these initiatives, he wrote to the Japanese foreign minister sometime in 1943, offering to employ the Jerusalem congress network to raise an "Islamic army" of Asian Muslim volunteers, to fight alongside Japanese forces.⁴² In June 1944, in the wake of a letter from Arslan, he proposed a still more elaborate program of Japanese-Muslim cooperation, again in a communication to the Japanese foreign minister. This time he offered to send a personal representative whose task would be the organization of an "Islamic liberation army" composed of Asian Muslims, and proposed a pact between Japan and the "Islamic leadership"—a transparent reference to himself.⁴³ This constituted an obvious attempt to circumvent the German Foreign Office in his pursuit of a decisive say in wider Muslim affairs, but, like his demand for a wartime Muslim congress, the proposal came to nothing.

"It is a characteristic of the Moslem world, from the shores of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific, that what affects one, for good or evil, affects all." This was the revised judgment of Hitler, made during the last months of war in besieged Berlin. "We had a great chance of pur-

suing a splendid policy with regard to Islam. But we missed the bus, as we missed it on several other occasions, thanks to our loyalty to the Italian alliance." The Italians, still remembered for their "barbarous reprisals" against Muslim resistance in Libya, "created a feeling of *malaise* among our Islamic friends, who inevitably saw in us accomplices, willing or unwilling, of their oppressors." Alone, Germany could have "aroused the enthusiasm of the whole of Islam."⁴⁴ On the brink of defeat, the ridicule expressed in *Mein Kampf* of such "cowardly speculation" was forgotten. But while the "whole of Islam" did remain uncommitted, the leading Muslim cosmopolitans had openly embraced the German cause, and now could not escape the humiliation of defeat.

Not one figure who had organized a past Muslim congress now came forward to declare a Muslim preference for the Allied cause. The proposal that a new Muslim congress be organized to elicit such a declaration received but brief consideration, prompted by a cable from Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, to the Secretary of State at the India Office. In this awkwardly worded communication of July 1940, the Viceroy suggested that a British-inspired Muslim congress might serve an important war aim:

I have wondered once or twice whether it was worth suggesting that you might consider whether His Majesty's Government ought not to try to encourage and strengthen the obvious feeling among Moslems that Axis expansion in Mohamedan regions was against the interests of Islam, and possibly even to consider the practicability and desirability (as to which His Majesty's Government are in a much better position to reach any conclusion than we can possibly be here) of promoting somewhere a Pan-Islamic conference which might voice these feelings.

The Viceroy offered no clear solution to the immediate problems of venue and sponsor raised by his proposal, except to point out that the congress could not be held in his own domain:

There are I think very obvious objections to choosing India which is a follower rather than a leader in Islamic activities, but it is just conceivable that if you thought there was anything in the idea at all it might be worth sounding [British ambassador to Egypt Miles] Lampson as to whether Cairo or Egypt might not be a useful venue. I seem to have seen recently a speech by the Rector of Al Azhar University [Mustafa al-Maraghi] in which he referred to Cairo as centre of Islam, though I am of course well aware that Ibn Saud or the King of the Yemen would be likely to take a very different view of any such claim, and that full weight would have to be given to risk of any stressing of it giving rise to dissensions between

various Islamic countries rather than promoting a single front against Axis expansion, which we should be anxious to see.⁴⁵

But commentators at the India and Foreign Offices did not discern this "obvious feeling" among Muslims against Axis expansion. Roland Peel, political secretary at the India Office, thought that "the objections to any kind of Pan-Islamic Conference are overwhelming." No Muslim leader had the uncontested authority necessary to convene such an assembly, and the choice of a venue was bound to result in unwholesome controversy. Cairo was arguably the best setting, but "even if the Conference were successfully assembled, how are you to insure that the right kind of feelings will be voiced? It is much more likely that they would get on to awkward questions like Palestine and Syria. I am afraid that the risk of promoting dissension between the Islamic countries, rather than a united front against Axis expansion is a real one, and I feel sure that the F[oreign] O[ffice] would be firmly opposed to any idea of a Conference."⁴⁶

This conservative conjecture proved sound. The Foreign Office held that such a forum would be difficult to convene and control, for "it might degenerate into an anti-British meeting . . . anyone disposed to criticise our measures for the defence against Axis expansion of British territory inhabited by Moslems might take the opportunity to voice his views at the Conference."⁴⁷ The Viceroy was informed of this verdict, and he withdrew his suggestion.⁴⁸

Nor was there a single Muslim cosmopolitan prepared to lend of his personal prestige to the war effort. Shaykh Mustafa al-Maraghi, whom Lord Linlithgow had mentioned as an interested party, perhaps did have a stake, for he held Amin al-Husayni in low regard, and lost no opportunity to question this rival's Muslim credentials.⁴⁹ But early in the conflict, Shaykh Maraghi made it known that he saw no point in Egypt's declaring war against the Axis powers.⁵⁰ The first Axis bombings of Egyptian cities led him to take to the pulpit to charge that Egypt had been dragged into a war against its will, and that the only reward the country had reaped for allowing the British to base their armies there had been the killing of innocent men, women, and children.⁵¹

Unable to secure a convincing Muslim endorsement of the Allied cause, Great Britain developed Muslim propaganda along other lines. The theme of this bid was Great Britain's record of demonstrated respect for Muslim religious freedom, and as further proof of this solicitude, British officials actively encouraged the establishment of a central mosque in London. The new edifice figured prominently in news and information provided to Muslims through various Allied media.⁵² But with the leading Muslim cosmopolitans arrayed on the side of the en-

emy, the principal avenues of propaganda led necessarily in different directions.

The Axis defeat dealt a serious blow to the Muslim cosmopolitans and the congresses they had championed. They had lost none of their moral authority, accumulated during years of struggle against foreign rule. In the eyes of their followers, they lost no credibility for having collaborated with totalitarian states. They had made a wrong choice, but not an evil one. Yet through their exertions on behalf of the Axis cause, they had identified activist Islam with collaboration in the mind of the West, and the Allied powers which stood to remake the Muslim world were no longer prepared to indulge them or treat with them. This denial of recognition proved an insurmountable handicap. Muslim peoples, anxious to gain some advantage from the war, turned to leaders whom the victorious powers were prepared to recognize — to the secular nationalists who had supported the Allies during the war, and who demanded and got as their reward not the liberation of the Muslim world, but freedom and independence for their individual peoples.

32. On these communities, see the sources provided by Alexandre Popovic, "Les Musulmans du Sud-Est européen dans la période post-ottomane."
33. On Misali's relationship with Arslan, see Bessis, "Chekib Arslan," *passim*; for his recollection of the congress, see Messali Hadj, *Les mémoires de Messali Hadj*, 195-99.
34. [Shah], "European Muslim Congress," 396-97.
35. Prentiss B. Gilbert (Geneva), dispatch of October 2, 1935, *NA*, RG59, 540.4 V1/4.
36. *Oriente Moderno* (1935), 15: 564.
37. [Shah], "European Muslim Conference," 396.
38. "Le Congrès Musulman d'Europe," *La Nation arabe* (October-November 1935), 7(7): 419. On Barbiellini, see *Oriente Moderno* (1932), 12: 72-73.
39. [Shah], "European Muslim Conference," 396-97; similar report in *Oriente Moderno* (1935), 15: 503.
40. Arslan, *Aucune Propagande au monde*, 8.
41. "Discours de Ihsan Bey El-Djabri, prononcé au Congrès Musulman d'Europe," *La Nation arabe* (July-August-September 1935), 5(6): 379-85.
42. *Ibid.*, 376.
43. *La Nation arabe* (October-November 1935), 5(7): 422.
44. *Al-Muqattam*, October 9, 1935; *Oriente Moderno* (1935), 15: 566-67.
45. Prentiss B. Gilbert (Geneva), dispatch of October 2, 1935, *NA*, RG59, 540.4 V1/4.
46. An exception also was made for the Viennese Turcologist Herbert Jansky, who also attended the congress.
47. British consulate (Geneva) to Chancery (Bern), October 2, 1935, FO371/18925, E6005/5696/65.
48. *La Nation arabe* (October-November 1935), 5(7): 423-24; "Il Congresso dei Musulmani d'Europa a Ginevra."
49. *Filastin*, September 19, 1935; *al-Fath*, September 26, 1935; *Oriente Moderno* (1935), 15: 503-4.
50. *Al-Muqattam*, October 9, 1935; *Oriente Moderno* (1935), 15: 565-66.
51. Transcript of Arslan's interrogation by the Police de Sûreté, Geneva, October 6, 1938, *SFA*, C.10.7.
52. Mussolini's speech of March 12, 1937, and Ciano's speech of May 13, 1937, in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Documents on International Affairs 1937*, 267, 283.

13. CONGRESSES OF COLLABORATION

1. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, 151.
2. *Ibid.*, 151-52.
3. Activities of the Indian Muslim delegation reported by W. A. Smart (Cairo) to P. C. Bamford (Simla), October 28, 1938, FO371/21884, E6732/10/31. See also the reports from the delegates to Jinnah in Atique Zafar Sheikh, ed. *Quaid-e-Azam and the Muslim World*, 27-41, 65-76.
4. On the congress, see Ettore Rossi, "Il Congresso interparlamentare arabo e musulmano pro Palestina al Cairo (7-11 ottobre)"; and the organizer's own account in Muhammad 'Ali 'Alluba, *Filastin wa-jaratuhu*, 7-9, 115-16.
5. For an informative if overwrought account of this policy, see O. S. S. Research and Analysis Report 890, "Japanese Infiltration among Muslims throughout the World," May 15, 1943, *NA*, RG59.
6. On Ibrahim's career in general, see the sources cited in ch. 1, n. 34. On Ibrahim's early activities in Japan, see Abdürreşid Ibrahim, *Âlemi İslâm ve Japonya'da istigârı İslâmiyet; Nakaba Wakabayashi, Kaikyo sekai to Nihon*, 8-10, *passim*; and Ettore Rossi, "Le relazioni tra il Giappone e il mondo musulmano e l'opera di 'Abd er-Rashîd İbrâhîm." On the impression made upon Muslims by the Japanese victory over Russia, see Klaus Kreiser,

"Der japanische Steg über Russland (1905) und sein Echo unter der Muslimen."

7. On the structure of the Tatar Muslim expatriate community in Japan, see O. S. S. Research and Analysis Report 890.2, "Japanese Attempts at Infiltration among Muslims in Russia and her Borderlands," August 1944, pp. 31-37, *NA*, RG59; M. Abdul Aziz, *The Crescent in the Land of the Rising Sun*, 11-25; and Berthold Spuler, "Die Lage der russland-türkischen Emigration im Fernen Osten."

8. For an account of the opening, see R. Craigie (Tokyo), dispatch of May 9, 1938, FO371/22193, F6413/5214/23.

9. Internal Report on Financial Aid to the Greater Japan Muslim League (for 1939), April 19, 1940, *JMFA*, reel S328, frame 1039. I am indebted to Tetsuo Masuda for his translation of official Japanese documents.

10. On the Manchukuo League, see O. S. S. Research and Analysis Report 890.1, "Japanese Infiltration among Muslims in China," May 15, 1944, pp. 43-44, 96, *NA*, RG59.

11. *Ibid.*, 31-43, on the All China Muslim League; see also Yang Ching-chih, "Japan—Protector of Islam!" 476-77.

12. On Muzakkir, see Mitsuo Nakamura, "M. Professor Haji Kahar Muzakkir and the Development of the Muslim Reformist Movement in Indonesia." On Kasmat and Ma'ruf, see Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, 419, 424-25.

13. For a day-by-day account of the activities as viewed by an Indonesian participant, see H. M. Farid Ma'roef, *Melawat ke Japan*, 1-17. The author provides the names of other guests at the exhibition, and a brief account of the congress convened on November 18, 1939. I am indebted to Benedict Anderson for translating passages from this pamphlet. For evidence of the request, see Greater Japan Muslim League to Islamic Office of Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries, April 26, 1940, *JMFA*, reel S328, frame 1051.

14. Greater Japan Muslim League to Islamic Office of Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministries, April 26, 1940; Islamic Affairs Committee of Foreign Office to Greater Japan Muslim League, May 9, 1940; both in *JMFA*, reel S328, frames 1050-51; Foreign Ministry to Consul General in Batavia, *JMFA*, reel S328, frame 1048.

15. Abdürreşid Ibrahim (Tokyo) to Amin al-Husayni (Berlin), Mufti Files, p. 00094.

16. Netherlands Information Bureau, *Ten Years of Japanese Burrowing in the Netherlands East Indies*, 26.

17. See Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 103-31.

18. Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, 747.

19. Grobba memorandum on the Arab question, March 7, 1941, in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, ser. D, 12: 235.

20. On the Berlin period of his career, see Lukasz Hirszowicz, *The Third Reich and the Arab East*, 211-313; Anthony R. De Luca, "'Der Grossmufti' in Berlin: The Politics of Collaboration"; and Daniel Carpi, "The Mufti of Jerusalem, Amin el-Husseini, and His Diplomatic Activities during World War II (October 1941-July 1943)."

21. Arslan (Geneva) to Amin al-Husayni, Dhu al-Hijja 29, 1361, Mufti Files, p. 00295.

22. *Ibid.*, June 1, 1944, Mufti Files, p. 00317.

23. *Ibid.*, Jumada II, 13, 1362, Mufti Files, p. 00356.

24. Undated memorandum to Amin al-Husayni ("our demand must rest upon the following foundations"), Mufti Files, pp. 00423-24.

25. Amin al-Husayni (Berlin) memorandum [to Ribbentrop], October 20, 1943, Mufti Files, pp. 00201-5. The memorandum reiterates a program presented still earlier to the German Foreign Office.

26. On the history of Berlin's Muslim organizations, see M. S. Abdullah, *Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland*, 23-34.

27. On the Zentralinstitut, see Erwin Ettel (Berlin) to Ernst Woermann, December 11, 1942, *GFO*, reel 392, frames 930/297972-73. I am indebted to Daniel Dishon for his assistance in reading German diplomatic documents.

28. Erwin Ettl (Berlin) to Ernst Woermann, December 11, 1942, *GFO*, reel 392, frame 930/297977.
29. Mustafa al-Wakil to Ernst Woermann, [December 14, 1941], *GFO*, reel 392, frames 930/297960–61.
30. Abd al-Halim Naggar and Mansooruddin (Berlin) to Amin al-Husayni, December 14, 1942, *GFO*, reel 392, frame 930/297955.
31. Woermann (Berlin) to Kurt Prüfer, December 14, 1942, *GFO*, reel 392, frame 930/297958.
32. Minute of Bose-Ribbentrop meeting, October 14, 1942, *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918–1945*, ser. E, 4: 84–87; Reimund Schnabel, *Tiger und Schakal: Deutsche Indienpolitik, 1941–1943*, 277–78.
33. *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, September 24, 1942.
34. Woermann memorandum, December 12, 1942, *GFO*, reel 392, frames 930/297968–69.
35. Wilhelm Melchers (Berlin) to Woermann, December 16, 1942, *GFO*, reel 392, frames 930/297948–50. On the incident, see also Grobba, *Männer und Mächte im Orient*, 308.
36. Islamische Zentralinstitut, *Die Rede Seiner Eminenz des Grossmufti Anlässlich der Eröffnung des Islamischen Zentral-Institutes zu Berlin*, in *GFO*, reel 392, frames 930/297941–45; *Völkischer Beobachter* (Berlin), December 19, 1942.
37. Amin al-Husayni to Hitler, [December 1942], *GFO*, reel 396, frame 930/304371.
38. For an account of this activity, see S. Wiesenthal, *Grossmufti—Grossagent der Achse*, 29–30.
39. Amin al-Husayni (Oybin) to Ribbentrop, November 12, 1944, Mufti Files, pp. 00187–88. The official was Wilhelm Melchers.
40. On these activities, see Ladislaus Hory and Martin Broszat, *Der kroatische Ustascha-Staat 1941–1945*, 154–61. It was this more consequential collaboration that led the Yugoslav government in July 1945 to place Amin al-Husayni on the United Nations' list of war criminals.
41. On the SS and Turkic Muslims, see Patrick von zur Mühlen, *Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern*, especially 139–69. On the Wehrmacht's efforts in this field, which preceded those of the SS, see Joachim Hoffmann, *Die Ostlegionen, 1941–1943*, especially 136–46 on religious guidance.
42. Amin al-Husayni (Berlin) to Japanese Foreign Minister, n.d. [1943], Mufti Files, pp. 00919, 00947–48.
43. *Ibid.*, June 22, 1944, Mufti Files, pp. 00917–18, 00949.
44. *The Testament of Adolf Hitler. The Hitler-Bormann Documents, February–April 1945*, 71.
45. Viceroy to Secretary of State, India Office, July 14, 1940, L/P&S/12/2118.
46. Minute by R. Peel, July 17, 1940, L/P&S/12/2118.
47. L. Baggallay (Foreign Office) to R. Peel (India Office), August 1, 1940, L/P&S/12/2118.
48. R. Peel (India Office) to Viceroy, August 4, 1940; Viceroy to Peel, August 5, 1940, L/P&S/12/2118.
49. For Maraghi's view of Amin al-Husayni, see M. P. Waters, *Mufti over the Middle East*, 9.
50. Muhammad Husayn Haykal, *Mudhakkirat fi'l-siyasa al-misriyya*, 2: 197.
51. Allan A. Michie, *Retreat to Victory*, 145.
52. On the mosque and the war, see A. L. Tibawi, "History of the London Central Mosque and the Islamic Cultural Centre 1910–1980," 197–204.

CONCLUSIONS

1. El-Djabri, "Le Congrès Islamique d'Europe," 373.