

# Islam Assembled

The Advent of the Muslim Congresses

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MARTIN KRAMER

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## ONE

# THE COSMOPOLITAN MILIEU

### *Pan-Islamic Ideals*

**T**HE EXPANSION of the West into Muslim lands redefined for Muslim peoples the meaning of universal community. Before modern times, those conflicts which separated Muslims, whether on sectarian or political grounds, were waged by all sides with the confidence and intolerance of total conviction. The most enduring of these struggles, a contest which loomed nearly as large in Muslim historical consciousness as that between Muslim and Christian, divided Sunni and Shi'ī. From the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, Ottoman and Crimean armies waged periodic wars against the Safavids and their successors which, for sheer ferocity, rivaled any contemporary Ottoman engagement with the Christian foe in Europe. During these confrontations, Ottoman ulama went so far as to declare that Safavid domains were not Muslim, and were legally indistinguishable from the territories of hostile Christendom. On their part, Safavid rulers actively sought alliances with Christian powers against their common Ottoman adversary. The supposed waste represented by this conflict held a great attraction for nineteenth-century Muslim moralists, familiar with a far more dynamic brand of Western military, commercial, and cultural activity. In 1881, the Young Ottoman journalist and novelist Namık Kemal (1840–1888) published a historical novel entitled *Cezmi*, set in the morass of late-sixteenth-century conflict between Safavid Iran and the Ottoman-Crimean league. The author has the brother of the Crimean Khan Mehmed Giray II fall in love with the daughter of Shah Tahmasp. Together they discuss the unity of Islam, and the joining of the three great neighboring polities against their shared Christian foe. The story reaches a climax of jealousy and murder, in the romantic style which so influenced Kemal's literary productions.<sup>1</sup>

The same retrospective fascination was evoked by the attempt to enforce an exchange between Sunni and Shi'ī in 1743, at the insistence of Nadir Shah. In the midst of his military campaign against the Ottomans in Iraq, the Shah summoned the Sunni scholar 'Abdallah ibn Husayn al-Suwaydi of Baghdad, and lamented that accusations of unbe-

lief (*kufr*) were exchanged among the Muslims of his kingdom. The ulama were to offer proofs for their mutual vilifications in an open forum. ʿAbdallah relates that he presided at Najaf over a two-day gathering of Shiʿi and Sunni ulama from throughout Nadir Shah’s realm.<sup>2</sup> About seventy participants were from Iran; among the Sunnis, apparently all Hanafis, were eight Afghans and seven Uzbeks. The Iranian ulama finally signed a document in which they agreed to abandon the cursing of the first three caliphs in their Friday sermon (*khutba*), and the Afghan and Uzbek ulama affirmed in writing that they recognized the Shiʿis as Muslims constituting one of the sects (*firaq*) of Islam. Subtle coercion was involved in the extraction of this brief reconciliation. When ʿAbdallah went to a mosque in Kufa on Friday to hear the blessing of the caliphs in the Shiʿi sermon, he was certain that the sermonizer meant an insult to the caliph ʿUmar by vowing a letter of his name incorrectly.<sup>3</sup> But this did not dampen the nineteenth-century Muslim impulse to romanticize the conciliatory efforts of Nadir Shah.

The modern Muslim interest in this and other attempts to moderate sectarian conflict was prompted by the continued animosity between Sunni and Shiʿi. The orientalist E. G. Browne gave anecdotal expression to the durability of this hostility:

The antipathy between Turk and Persian is profound, and, in my opinion, indestructable, and is both national and religious. A dervish at Khuy, in North-West Persia, boasted to me that he and some of his fellow-dervishes had accompanied the Russian army during the Russo-Turkish War, and aided the Russian arms by their prayers. I need not say that I do not ascribe the victory of the Russians entirely to this cause; and I daresay that the whole story was a figment of the dervish’s fertile imagination, and that he was never near the seat of war at all; but that is neither here nor there: I merely refer to the incident as indicating how little sympathy exists between the Persians and the Turks on religious grounds.<sup>4</sup>

It was only the acceleration of Russian expansion at both Ottoman and Iranian expense that diminished this rooted hostility. During Iran’s constitutional revolution, a period marked by Russian encroachments on Iranian territory, the Shiʿi religious authorities resident in Iraq forged an alliance with Ottoman authorities against Muhammad ʿAli Shah and Russian expansion. A number of the most esteemed Iranian Shiʿi ulama met in Baghdad where they issued a proclamation calling for close cooperation between the Ottoman and Iranian states. “The complete union of Muslims, the preservation of the seed of Islam, the preservation of Islamic nations, Ottoman and Persian, against the enterprises of foreign nations and attacks of outside powers—on all these points, we are in accord. . . . We announce to the entire Persian nation that it is an obligation to have confidence in the Ottoman nation, and to offer it

aid, so that it may conserve its independence, protect its territory, and preserve its frontiers from invasion by foreigners."<sup>5</sup> Even E.G. Browne no longer thought the old antipathy insurmountable, and chastised those who did: "Even those who think they know about the East cannot or will not believe that an *entente* between Sunnis-Shi'as is possible, whereas it is now practically a *fait accompli*, since the formal joint manifesto issued by the ulama of both parties at Baghdad. I know this not only from the Persian papers but from private letters from well-informed quarters in Kerbala too."<sup>6</sup>

This reconciliation, short-lived though it proved to be, represented the most striking example of the unifying potential of reaction to Western expansion. Divisions between Muslims diminished, however briefly, before the greater challenge of foreign encroachment, as the great Muslim empires lost influence, then territory, to an ascendant West. By the late nineteenth century, reformers could posit the existence of an almost universal Muslim predicament, one of subjugation to the West, and they held that discord within the community of believers was partly to blame for their own tribulations. The affective affinity of Muslims on the plane of theory was not sufficient. What was required now was effective solidarity.

The Muslim congress responded to the disorientation caused by the nineteenth-century expansion of the West into Muslim lands. The search for a remedy in the technique of assembly tapped the self-indicting conviction that Muslims had invited Western conquest and influence by their own discord, and had squandered their resources in internecine warfare while Christendom waxed.<sup>7</sup> But the congress was only one of several techniques that competed for the attention of those seeking to defend Muslims against the consequences of their own divisions. And the reception of this technique was affected by another response to the impact of the West: intensified attachment to the institution of the Ottoman caliphate and the person of the Ottoman sultan-caliph.

From a narrowly academic point of view, the Ottoman claim to the universal caliphate was not impeccable, and was vulnerable on the point of Qurashi descent. But the failure of the Ottomans to meet this requirement led even rigorous jurists not to a rejection of the Ottoman claim, but to suspension of the requirement, particularly within the Ottoman Empire. There, Muslim jurists and theologians, not to exclude the Arabic-speakers among them, withheld criticism and maintained the legitimacy of the Ottoman claim.<sup>8</sup> Dissenting voices were nearly inaudible, and were confined to a few remote provinces. The theory of the caliphate as circulated in the Ottoman Empire contained hardly an allusion to Qurashi descent and election, and substituted the enforce-

ment of the holy law and the militant defense of Islam as valid criteria for measurement of any claim to the Muslim caliphate.<sup>9</sup> The Ottomans fulfilled both of these obligations to the satisfaction of many jurists among their subjects, for whom the Ottoman state and dynasty constituted the only firm bulwark against total subjugation to the rule of foreigners.

A different question was whether that caliphate was universal, whether the Ottoman caliph was the suzerain of Muslims over whom he was not sovereign. The case for the universal validity of the Ottoman caliphate was not wholly contrived, and had circulated some three hundred years before its reassertion in the nineteenth century. The great Muslim prestige enjoyed by the Ottoman state as early as the sixteenth century was a consequence of the Ottoman role as diffusor of firearms and technologies current in Europe to Muslim peoples threatened by Portuguese, Russian, or Iranian expansion.<sup>10</sup> This is in clearest evidence in the example of sixteenth-century Ottoman military aid to the Muslims of Atjeh, then under Portuguese pressure. Accounts in Indonesian, Turkish, and Portuguese sources establish that the Ottomans were pursuing broad recognition of their caliphate even at this early date. From these sources, it appears that Atjehnese Muslims were prepared to accept nominal Ottoman suzerainty and accord the title of universal caliph (*khalifat allah f'l-ard*) to the Ottoman sultan, in exchange for material aid.<sup>11</sup>

The Ottoman admiral Seydi Ali Reis also advanced the universal claims of his sovereign at the Mughal court of Humayun, then also under Portuguese naval pressure, and these claims were received favorably. Humayun's successor Akbar also employed the title of universal caliph in addressing the Ottoman sultan.<sup>12</sup> A third sixteenth-century example survives in Ottoman correspondence with Malik Idris of Bornu, in which a letter to Idris from the Ottoman sultan again advanced a universal claim, along with an implicit promise of firearms.<sup>13</sup> Sixteenth-century recognition of this early Ottoman pretension was the consequence of a desire among Muslims elsewhere to share or benefit from superior Ottoman military technology and power. The claim to general suzerainty of the Ottoman caliphs over Muslims beyond the Ottoman Empire dates from that earlier century of crisis.

The reassertion of the Ottoman claim in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and its recognition by Muslims beyond the empire, thus rested upon assumptions that were not wholly of modern manufacture.<sup>14</sup> What initially appeared to Muslims as a repetition of that sixteenth-century challenge evoked a response patterned along earlier precedent. Once again, Muslims in Central Asia, Sumatra, and India embraced the Ottoman sultan as their caliph. In the nineteenth century,

as in the sixteenth, the Ottoman state remained the strongest Muslim power; as in the sixteenth century, Muslims threatened by an expanding West were anxious to exchange professions of allegiance for whatever military, diplomatic, or moral aid the Ottomans could spare them.

Sultan Abdülaziz (r.1861–1876) reasserted the Ottoman claim to the caliphate as a response to the entreaties of these besieged Muslims. The principal figures in this awakening were not Ottoman emissaries abroad, but Muslim political refugees who crossed Ottoman borders bearing their grievances. The impact was first felt shortly after the French conquest of Algiers, with the departure of a small number of Algerian Muslims for Syria. For the next eighty years, Algerian refugees continued to make their way east to Ottoman territories.<sup>15</sup> As early as 1845, during the Şamil uprising in Daghestan, Muslim refugees were issuing appeals within the Ottoman Empire for aid against Russia.<sup>16</sup> In 1852, Mappilla disturbances led the English to expel from Malabar the Tannal of Mambram, Sayyid Fadl ibn ʿAlawi (1830–1900), who later became an intimate advisor to Abdülhamid II, and was responsible for an attempt to assert an Ottoman claim, long in abeyance, to Dhufar.<sup>17</sup> From 1854, in the wake of the Crimean War, a large wave of Crimean Muslim refugees swept into Istanbul and Anatolian coastal towns, leaving an indelible impression on those who witnessed the influx.<sup>18</sup> Circassian Muslims also began to arrive in large numbers after the Crimean War and the consequent Russian policy of consolidation in the Caucasus. The refugees, who arrived in a series of waves over the next half a century, were resettled in the Balkans and Syria.<sup>19</sup> The suppression of the Great Mutiny and the Mughal dynasty in India in 1857 also brought many refugees to Ottoman territories. One, Rahmat Allah Kairanawi (1818–1890), endorsed the jihad against English rule and escaped to Mecca with a price on his head following the collapse of the Mutiny. Under the sultan-caliph's benevolent patronage, he wrote a major and enduring anti-Christian polemic.<sup>20</sup> Later began a stream of refugees and emissaries from Central Asia to the Ottoman capital itself, with profound effect. In the case of these territories, under growing Russian and Chinese pressure in the 1860s, the initiatives came from the endangered khanates themselves.<sup>21</sup> From 1873, the sultanate of Atjeh found itself at war with Holland, and turned expectantly to the sultan-caliph. The Ottomans had all but forgotten their claim to the territory, and it was the notion of a Hadrami *sayyid* in Atjehnese service, Habib ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Zahir (1833–1896), to appear in Istanbul and dramatically remind the Ottomans of alleged obligations incurred by their suzerain status.<sup>22</sup> One of the last important waves of refugees comprised Tunisians fleeing French rule, who played a major role in Istanbul's Muslim émigré community.<sup>23</sup> To accommodate this influx of refugees, the Ot-

toman government in 1860 established a special commission for Muslim immigration. This body continued to function for over four decades, in various forms and under various names, whenever the need arose. Renewed interest in the Ottoman caliphate began beyond the Ottoman Empire, among these besieged Muslims who thus hoped to gain Ottoman military, financial, and moral support. Its purpose was quite different from the later policy launched from Istanbul during the reign of Abdülhamid II, a policy which instead cast the Ottomans themselves as the recipients of Muslim material and moral assistance.

Abdülhamid II (r.1876–1909) continued the policy of resettling refugees and receiving delegations from territories under Western pressure, but he also sought to generate Muslim support for his caliphate in places where such support had yet to emerge spontaneously. Unable to defend his own frontiers effectively, and even less able or prepared to liberate fragments of other Muslim empires already under Western rule, he was drawn to claim a spiritual authority no longer dependent upon possession of the sinews of power. His was a policy intended to conceal weakness, to create an illusion of latent strength. The emissary, diffusing the message of the Ottoman sultan-caliph at the periphery of the empire and beyond, was the conspicuous figure in this policy of active self-assertion. In this role, he supplanted the refugee as the stimulant of solidarity.

In the doctrine associated with Abdülhamid, authority was personified in the radiant Ottoman sultan-caliph, and amplified by his possession of Mecca and Madina; around his person and his sacred possessions in Arabia revolved all Muslims. But not all were in close orbit. Most simply faced the sultan-caliph's territories in prayer; fewer cited him in their prayers; still fewer visited or resided in his domains; yet fewer bore arms in his cause. It was the task of Abdülhamid's emissaries to make Muslims aware of the 'sultan-caliph's prerogatives, and to ask more of those Muslims who already had acknowledged Ottoman primacy. Those emissaries gifted in speech traveled widely in the Ottoman Empire and abroad, while those prolific in the written word were maintained in Istanbul at the expense of the treasury. Together they formed a chain of transmission for the message of Ottoman primacy which, by spoken or printed word, was intended to reach the most distant Muslim enclaves.

Abdülhamid first assembled a number of Muslims from his own Arabic-speaking provinces, and in Istanbul they published works extolling the Ottoman sultan-caliph and insisting upon the absolute nature of his authority.<sup>24</sup> The most prolific of these authors was Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi (1850–1909), a Rifa'i shaykh from the vicinity of Aleppo who enjoyed the full confidence of Abdülhamid and spent his creative



years writing, publishing, and intriguing in Istanbul. His most significant work, published for Arabic- and Turkish-reading audiences, argued that absolute and unqualified obedience to the Ottoman caliph was a duty incumbent upon all Muslims.<sup>25</sup> Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi was one of several figures at the court who disseminated a similar message in a similar manner. Alongside him served Muhammad Zafir al-Madani (1828–1906) of Misurata in Libya. A shaykh of the Madaniyya sub-order of the predominantly North African Shadhiliyya order, he settled in Istanbul in 1875 and remained there for thirty years, enjoying an influence over Abdülhamid second only to that of Sayyid Abu al-Huda. His special sphere of activity extended to Morocco, where he sought to disseminate the message of Ottoman primacy by organizing Ottoman military missions to Mawlay Hasan and an Ottoman legation at Fez. Neither effort succeeded.<sup>26</sup> Also in Istanbul was Husayn al-Jisr (1845–1909), an Azhar-educated shaykh from Syrian Tripoli who titled two of his famous works in honor of Abdülhamid, although he was on the edge of that closed Arabic-speaking circle which Abdülhamid had assembled around himself.<sup>27</sup> Another figure in Abdülhamid's service was the aforementioned Shaykh Fadl ibn 'Alawi, who had arrived as a refugee from Malabar in 1852 and whose task as an emissary was to reconcile dissident sentiment in Arabia. His most accomplished student in Istanbul was the Ottoman link to the Muslims of the East African littoral. Ahmad ibn Sumayt (1861–1925), a Comorian also of Hadrami descent, had been a religious court judge in Zanzibar before fleeing to Istanbul in 1886. There he remained for two years as a guest, and returned to Zanzibar where he became an advocate of greater attachment to the Ottoman sultan-caliph.<sup>28</sup> That these Arabic-speaking emissaries of the Ottoman word were sorely divided by personal rivalries was established by a contemporary observer, but their work was not without effect among Arabic-speakers in the provinces and beyond.<sup>29</sup>

To bring the Ottoman message to Shi'ī Muslims, the court relied in part upon Jamal al-Din al-Afghani/Asadabadi (1838–1897), an Iranian-born cosmopolitan who traveled widely in the Muslim world, teaching advanced ideas of religious reform, and jostling for a position of influence. Although his early teachings were void of pan-Islamic references, Afghani later pressed Abdülhamid to enlist him, as a roving Ottoman emissary or as an Istanbul consultant.<sup>30</sup> Only in 1892, after Afghani's expulsion from Iran, did Abdülhamid decide to employ him, probably to exploit his intensified hostility toward Nasir al-Din Shah. An arrangement similar to that enjoyed by Abu al-Huda al-Sayyadi was accepted by Afghani, who was given a residence and allowance in Istanbul. In return, Afghani organized a small circle of Iranians in Istanbul, who launched a letter-writing campaign directed to Shi'ī ulama and

dignitaries in Iraq, Iran, Central Asia, and India, "about the kindness and benevolence of the great Islamic Sultan toward all Muslims of whatever opinion and group they might be."<sup>31</sup> A short time later, however, Afghani clashed with Sayyid Abu al-Huda, fell out of favor, and died a virtual captive in 1897. The campaign to win the sympathies of Shi'ī ulama fell in part to the Ottoman ambassador in Teheran. According to a British diplomat,

He belonged to a secret confraternity of dervishes, I think the Bektashis, cultivated a fairly long beard, and was profoundly interested in the metaphysical theology of Islam, which he used to explain and discuss with me at considerable length. He was himself, really, I think, a Sufi . . . [which] facilitated his intercourse with the more learned members of the Persian clergy, some of whom I often met and talked with at his house. I imagine, indeed, that he was chosen for this very purpose by Sultan Abdul Hamid.

The efforts of this Ottoman diplomat, continued Sir Arthur Hardinge, were not without effect: "I remember myself going with the Turkish Ambassador to hear a great Tehran Mullah preach during Moharram and being surprised at the fulsome eulogies which he heaped upon the Sultan of Turkey and on the sacred character of the latter as 'Lord of the two Continents and Seas' ('el barrein wa el bahrein')."<sup>32</sup>

To carry his message to points further east, the sultan-caliph relied upon other emissaries in the formal guise of diplomatic envoys and consular officials. One of the earliest of these was *kazasker* Ahmed Hüüsi Efendi, who in 1877 led an Ottoman mission to Kabul. There he attempted to erect a Muslim alliance against Russia by persuading the Afghan amir, Shir 'Ali, of his obligations toward the Ottoman sultan-caliph. The emissary even bore a letter from the Ottoman Şeyhülislam, who threatened to "issue a kind of excommunication" against Shir 'Ali's followers if they did not turn away from Russia.<sup>33</sup> Anti-Russian propagandists were always welcome in Istanbul, and the more eloquent refugees from Russian rule were encouraged to publish books and tracts against what was regarded as the perpetual enemy of the Muslims. Abdürreşid İbrahim[ov] (1857–1944), a Siberian-born Volga Tatar who studied and traveled throughout the Ottoman Empire, published a violently anti-Russian polemic in Istanbul, and later continued this work within Russia and back in Istanbul under the Young Turks.<sup>34</sup>

In India, the Ottomans operated a consular service, and it was to the consuls that expressions of allegiance to the Ottoman sultan-caliph were directed. These expressions were generated by that acute sense of loss evoked by the collapse of Mughal rule. Activity intensified during the Russo-Turkish war (1876–77), and centered around the Ottoman consul-

general in Bombay, who channeled funds collected by Indian Muslims to Istanbul, and distributed Ottoman decorations in return. Back in the Ottoman capital, a circle of Indian Muslims operated alongside the Arab and Iranian circles. They edited and published a virulently anti-British newspaper in Urdu, done on the imperial press and with heavy subventions. The newspaper, *Payk-i Islam*, was later closed at British insistence, but its editor continued to carry on his campaign both in Istanbul and London.<sup>35</sup>

The techniques employed in pursuit of this policy were thoroughly traditional, and were reminiscent of those medieval methods to which Muslim emissaries had resorted at earlier times, for similar purposes. The parallel which suggests itself most insistently is Fatimid propaganda, the tools of which were similar,<sup>36</sup> although Ottoman propaganda certainly differed in its reliance upon some modern instruments. Among these were the printing press, the cover provided by permanent diplomacy, and the mobility afforded by the steamer and railroad. The steamer in particular figured prominently in the movements of emissaries, their printed tracts, and their correspondence. It afforded safe and speedy transport, facilitated commercial, political, and intellectual exchange among Muslims, and presented a challenge to those Western states anxious to regulate that exchange.<sup>37</sup> The creation of a rail network had a similar effect, most notably in the Hijaz. The construction of this railway, accomplished with Muslim financial assistance from beyond the Ottoman Empire, rendered the pilgrimage safer and cheaper.<sup>38</sup> These improvements certainly made the task of the emissary easier, and helped to create that cosmopolitan climate in which his message flourished.

But the aim of the emissary, despite his employment of modern methods for the speedy spread of ideas, ultimately remained as conservative as the doctrine which he was employed to propagate. For the Ottoman emissary pursued not an exchange of ideas, but the propagation of a set of fixed principles about the nature of political and religious authority in Islam. The congress idea emerged as another answer to the same challenge of Western expansion which the emissary attempted to answer, and as another response to the same technological advances from which the emissary benefited. But it drew upon two radically different assumptions: the diffusion among scattered Muslim communities of that religious and political authority claimed by the sultan-caliph, and the supremacy of a consensus of these communities to any rival source of authority. The congress idea thus surfaced beyond the wide alliance of sentiment which Ottoman emissaries were building, and often in close association with political and intellectual innovators.



# NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

1. Louis Massignon, "L'entente islamique internationale et les deux congrès musulmans de 1926"; H. A. R. Gibb, *Whither Islam?* 354–64; Richard Hartmann, "Zum Gedanken des 'Kongresses' in den Reformbestrebungen des islamischen Orients."

### 1. THE COSMOPOLITAN MILIEU

1. The novel went through many editions. It is summarized by F. A. Tansel, ed. *Namık Kemal'in mektupları*, 2: 177–79. For more details on the publication of the book, see Ömer Faruk Akün, "Nâmık Kemal'in Kitap Halindeki Eserlerinin İlk Neşirleri." For Namık Kemal's appeal for Muslim solidarity in his own era, see Mustafa Özön, *Namık Kemal ve İbret Gazetesi*, 74–78.

2. The gathering was called a *majlis*; the dialogue, *muhawara*.

3. 'Abdallah Efendi ibn Husayn al-Suwaydi, *al-Hujjaj al-qat 'iyya li-ittifaq al-firaq al-islamiyya*, 22–27. Cf. L. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, 233; and Hamid Algar, "Shi'ism and Iran in the Eighteenth Century," 294–96.

4. E. G. Browne, "Pan-Islamism," 323.

5. Text of proclamation in *Revue du monde musulman* (1911), 13: 385–86. Details on the attitudes of Iraq's Shi'i scholars to the Ottoman state are provided by Abdul-Hadi Hairi, *Shi'ism and Constitutionalism in Iran*.

6. E. G. Browne (Cambridge) to Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, February 16, 1911, in Blunt-Chichester, file 9, "Edward G. Browne."

7. On the origins of this current of thought, see Dwight E. Lee, "The Origins of Pan-Islamism," and Nikki R. Keddie, "Pan-Islam as Proto-Nationalism."

8. H. A. R. Gibb, "Luṭfi Paşa on the Ottoman Caliphate," and Fritz Steppat, "Khalifat, *Dār al-Islām* und die Loyalität der Araber zum osmanischen Reich bei Ḥanafitischen Juristen des 19. Jahrhunderts."

9. See Gibb, *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, 141–50.

10. Halil İnalçık, "The Socio-Political Effects of the Diffusion of Fire-arms in the Middle East," 202–10.

11. Anthony Reid, "Sixteenth Century Turkish Influence in Western Indonesia"; Seljuk Affan, "Relations Between the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim Kingdoms in the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago"; and documents published by Razaulhak Şah, "Açı Padişahu Sultan Alâeddin'in Kanunî Sultan Süleyman'a Mektubu."

12. Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, 27–28.

13. B. G. Martin, "Maî Idrîs of Bornu and the Ottoman Turks, 1576–78," 478–79. A more complete set of documents was published by Cengiz Orhonlu, "Osmanlı-Bornu münasebetine âid belgeler."

14. This reassertion is described by Bernard Lewis, "Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: A Review," 290–94.

15. For Algerian immigration see Charles-Robert Ageron, *Les Algériens musulmans et la France (1871–1919)*, 2: 1079–92; see also J. Desparmet, "La turcophilie en Algérie," citing

extensively from folklore and poems. On the émigrés, see Pierre Bardin, *Algériens et Tunisiens dans l'Empire Ottoman de 1848 à 1914*.

16. Pertev Boratav, "La Russie dans les Archives ottomanes. Un dossier ottoman sur l'imâm Chamîl."

17. On the events which led to his expulsion, and the prestige which he continued to enjoy in Malabar, see Stephen F. Dale, "The Mappilla Outbreaks: Ideology and Social Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Kerala," 90-93; and his *Islamic Society on the South Asian Frontier*, 113-18, 127-37, 164-69. For Sayyid Fadl's activities in Dhofar, see J. G. Lorimer, *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, 1: 591-92, 595-97, 599; and J. B. Kelly, *Britain and the Persian Gulf*, 772-75.

18. Marc Pinson, "Russian Policy and the Emigration of the Crimean Tatars to the Ottoman Empire, 1854-1862."

19. Marc Pinson, "Ottoman Colonization of the Circassians in Rumili After the Crimean War," and Kemal H. Karpat, "The Status of the Muslim under European Rule: The Eviction and Settlement of the Cerkes."

20. A. A. Powell, "Maulānā Rahmat Allāh Kairānawī and Muslim-Christian Controversy in India in the Mid-19th Century." The polemic, entitled *Izhar al-haqq*, has seen many translations and editions, and in the past decade has enjoyed a renewed popularity, if one is to judge from the appearance of several new editions in Arabic and Urdu.

21. Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876*, 272-74. For an approach that might yield much on this subject, see Grace Martin Smith, "The Özbek Tekkes of Istanbul."

22. See the following works by Anthony Reid: "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia"; "Indonesian Diplomacy. A Documentary Study of Atjehnese Foreign Policy in the Reign of Sultan Mahmud, 1870-4"; "Habib Abdur-Rahman az-Zahir (1833-1896)"; and *The Contest for North Sumatra: Atjeh, the Netherlands, and Britain, 1858-1898*, 81-85, 119-29, 145-46.

23. 'Ali al-Shanufi, "Fasl min al-rihla al-hijaziyya li-Muhammad al-Sanusi." On Muhammad al-Sanusi, see Ali Chenoufi, *Un savant tunisien du XIX<sup>ème</sup> siècle: Muhammad as-Sanusi, sa vie et son oeuvre*.

24. This circle was first described by C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Eenige Arabische strijdschriften besproken" (originally published in 1897), and in summarized form in his review entitled "Les confréries religieuses, la Mecque, et le Panislamisme" (originally written in 1900).

25. On this figure, see the bibliographical article by Werner Ende, "Sayyid Abū al-Hudā, ein Vertrauter Abdülhamid's II. Notwendigkeit und Probleme einer kritischen Biographie," and B. Abu-Manneh, "Sultan Abdulhamid II and Shaikh Abulhuda Al-Sayyadi."

26. On Shaykh Zafir, see A. Le Chatelier, *Les Confréries musulmanes du Hedjaz*, 112-24; Jean-Louis Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe*, 4: 173-79; and Wali al-Din Yakan, *al-Ma'lam wa'l-majhul*, 100-101, 169-77. Real Ottoman progress was made in Morocco only at the end of Abdülhamid's reign, and under the Young Turk regime. See Jean Deny, "Instructeurs militaires turcs au Maroc sous Moulay Hafidh," and Edmund Burke, "Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912."

27. On his life, see the biographical preface by his son to an edition of his tract entitled *al-Risala al-hamidiyya*; and Ahmad al-Sharabasi, *Rashid Rida, sahib al-Manar*, 231-46 (Husayn al-Jisr was Rashid Rida's teacher).

28. On Ahmad ibn Sumayt, see B. G. Martin, "Notes on Some Members of the Learned Classes of Zanzibar and East Africa in the Nineteenth Century," 541-45; Randall Lee Pouwels, "Islam and Islamic Leadership in the Coastal Communities of Eastern Africa, 1700 to 1914," 492-501; and their sources. On the growth of pro-Ottoman sympathies

among the Muslims of East Africa, see K. Axenfeld, "Geistige Kämpfe in der Eingeborenenbevölkerung an der Küste Ostafrikas," especially 654f.

29. It was the thesis of Hurgronje, in his "Eenige Arabische strijdschriften besproken," that this circle was too torn by rivalries to constitute an efficient bureau of propaganda.

30. For his approach of 1879, see Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn 'al-Afghānī': A Political Biography*, 129–42, translating and analyzing the appeal in Iraj Afshar and Asghar Mahdavi, *Majmū'a-yi asnad ve-madarik-i chap nashuda dar bara-yi Sayyid Jamal al-Din mashhur bih-Afghani*, photos 26–27. For his approach of 1885, see Keddie, 246–68. For Afghani's last appeal, of 1892, see Jacob M. Landau, "Al-Afghānī's Pan-Islamic Project."

31. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn*, 380–81.

32. Arthur H. Hardinge, *A Diplomatist in the East*, 273–74.

33. There are at least three studies of this mission. See Dwight E. Lee, "A Turkish Mission to Afghanistan, 1877"; D. P. Singhal, "A Turkish Mission to Kabul—A Forgotten Chapter of History"; and M. Cavid Baysun, "Şirvanî-zade Ahmed Hulûsi Efendî'nin Efganistan elçiliğine âid vesikalar," where the diary of the mission is published.

34. On this figure, see Eşref Edib, "Meşhur İslâm seyyahı Abdürreşid İbrahim Efendi"; Azade-Ayse Rorlich, "Transition into the Twentieth Century: Reform and Secularization among the Volga Tatars," 233–35, 267–68; and Edward J. Lazzerini, "Abdurreşid İbrahimov (İbrahimov)."

35. On nineteenth-century Indian Muslim attachment to the Ottoman Empire, see R. M. Shukla, *Britain, India and the Turkish Empire 1853–1882*, 94–120; Y. B. Mathur, *Muslims and Changing India*, 120–34; and A. Halim, "Russo-Turkish War of 1876–77 and the Muslims of Bengal." The activities of the Indian Muslim circle in Istanbul are detailed by Shukla, 155–85.

36. Compare the Ottoman campaign to that described by M. Canard, "L'Impérialisme des Fātimides et leur propagande," and W. Ivanow, "The Organisation of the Fatimid Propaganda."

37. For one example of a reaction to this problem, as it arose in Algeria, see Pierre Boyer, "L'Administration française et la réglementation du pèlerinage à la Mecque (1830–1894)."

38. See William Ochsenwald, *The Hijaz Railroad*; and Jacob M. Landau, *The Hejaz Railway and the Muslim Pilgrimage: A Case of Ottoman Political Propaganda*.

## 2. A CHALLENGE TO AUTHORITY

1. On Blunt, see Elizabeth Longford, *A Pilgrimage of Passion: The Life of Wilfrid Scawen Blunt*; Albert Hourani, "Wilfrid Scawen Blunt and the Revival of the East"; and Kathryn Tidrick, *Heart-beguiling Araby*, 107–35.

2. "Alms to Oblivion," part 4, chapter 5, in Blunt-Fitzwilliam, MS. 323–1975.

3. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*, 66.

4. Hamid Algar, *Mīrzā Malkum Khān. A Study in the History of Iranian Nationalism*.

5. *Qanun*, no. 17 (issue not dated).

6. *Qanun*, no. 18 (issue not dated).

7. On Sabunji's English period, see L. Zolondek, "Sabunji in England 1876–91: His Role in Arabic Journalism."

8. Philippe de Tarrazi, *Tā'rikh al-sahafa al-'arabiyya*, 2: 251–52. The newspaper itself does not appear to have survived.

9. Tarrazi, *Tā'rikh al-sahafa*, 2:94, where his salary and position are described.

10. Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *My Diaries*, 2: 260.

11. Blunt, *Secret History*, 67.