Posts Tagged John Mearsheimer
“Israel Lobby” authors John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have published a rejoinder to their critics in the current issue of the London Review of Books. The careful reader will detect tactical retreats in nearly every paragraph. On the two points over which I challenged Mearsheimer in person three weeks ago in Princeton (while he and Walt were preparing their response), the retreats appear to be total.
The first has to do with the alleged role of Israel in pushing for the Iraq war. The original paper devoted an entire section to the authors’ claim that Israel used the Lobby to conduct a campaign in favor of war. Mearsheimer and Walt: “Pressure from Israel and the Lobby was not the only factor behind the decision to attack Iraq in March 2003, but it was critical.” At the Princeton conference, I provided a body of counter-evidence, which pointed to Israel’s dissent from the U.S. preoccupation with Iraq, and its fear that much-stronger Iran would benefit from the Iraq distraction. Evidence for this dissent even surfaced in leading U.S. papers in the year before the war, in articles that Mearsheimer and Walt failed to cite.
Here, then, is the reformulated Mearsheimer/Walt position: “[T]he lobby, by itself, could not convince either the Clinton or the Bush administration to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, there is abundant evidence that the neo-conservatives and other groups within the lobby played a central role in making the case for war.” Let’s count the retreats. First, Israel is no longer cited as pushing for war. Second, the lobby (with a lower-case “L” this time) is disaggregated into “groups,” and in any case takes second place to the neo-conservatives. Third, the role played by the “groups within the lobby” is now merely “central,” not “critical.” By my reading, the authors have backed down from at least half of their original claim about the origins of the Iraq war.
In the Princeton meet, I also argued that U.S. support for Israel had done nothing to damage that most central of all U.S. interests in the Middle East: access to Arab oil. My argument in short: it hasn’t affected the price or the delivery of a single barrel since the U.S. stepped up its support for Israel after 1973. It’s a point that Walt and Mearsheimer now concede in their latest statement: “Oil is clearly an important concern for US policymakers, but with the exception of episodes like the 1973 Opec oil embargo, the US commitment to Israel has yet to threaten access to oil.”
This is no minor concession. If support for Israel did contradict access to Arab oil, it would have been much more difficult to maintain and expand it. A year ago last January, Mearsheimer and Walt both signed a statement organized by the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy. It enumerated two “major national security objectives” in the Middle East: winning the war on terror and “ensuring continued access to Persian Gulf oil.” The statement made this assertion:
The Israeli-Palestinian stalemate also threatens the West’s continued access to the lifeblood of our economy: inexpensive Middle Eastern oil reserves. Recall that it was the Arab-Israeli conflict that first led the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to wield the oil weapon against Western countries thought to be too supportive of Israel. While economic self-interest makes it highly likely that all but the most militant Arab states will continue to sell oil to the rest of the world, the continuing Israeli-Palestinian conflict hinders the trade of an essential resource with an element of political tension that undermines U.S. interests.
This statement almost seems to contradict itself. But its core claim that the Israeli-Palestinian “stalemate” threatens access to oil is entirely specious . It was the 1973 war (between Israel and two Arab states, not the Palestinians) that last led OPEC to wield the oil weapon, more than thirty years ago. It hasn’t been wielded again. Three major showdowns between Israel and the Palestinians since then (Lebanon war and two intifadas) haven’t “hinder[ed] the trade” of oil in any way. Mearsheimer and Walt now admit as much, and it’s important to have that on the record. (Have a look at the other academic luminaries who signed that statement, and wonder how they could be so cavalier with their signatures.)
I’m going to make a prediction here: Mearsheimer and Walt will continue to back up from claims made in their original paper, not because of pressure but because they got in way over their heads on substance, and now they know it. They will continue to duel straw men, merely to cover the withdrawal or sacrifice of many of their main pieces. In doing so, they will lose the support of the extremists who earlier rushed to embrace them for their courage. They will thus have succeeded in enraging one half of their readers, and disappointing the other half. And they would advise Washington on strategy…
Noted: The bizarre petition launched by Juan Cole back on April 28, ostensibly in support of Mearsheimer and Walt against charges of antisemitism, has petered out well short of its extremely modest goal of 2,000 signatures. There are about 1,300 signatories at the moment, and only a handful sign on each day. It would be hard to compose a list of more obscure academics, ex-academics, stray students and alumni, and simple wannabes. The premise of the petition that the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations has some duty to police expression by Jews is absurd. I wonder whether Cole even consulted Mearsheimer and Walt before launching the petition. If not, he did them a disservice and owes them an apology.
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt includes a section entitled “Israel and the Iraq War” (pp. 30-31). There they seek to establish that Israel’s leaders, intelligence agencies, and public opinion enthusiastically supported a war to remove Saddam. Israel exerted “pressure” on the United States, fed Washington “alarming reports” on Iraq’s WMD capabilities, and beat the war drums in the media. Israelis were “so gung-ho for war that their allies in America told them to damp down their hawkish rhetoric, lest it look like the war was for Israel.” Israel thus became “a critical element” in pushing the United States to war.
Is this a full and accurate representation of what actually transpired? Let’s consider the full range of evidence—including that hidden away in such obscure sources as the Washington Post, the New York Times and page one of the Los Angeles Times.
In October 2002, analyst Barry Rubin wrote this in the Jerusalem Post: “If you told Israeli leaders and analysts two years ago that the U.S. would be on the verge of attacking Iraq today, they would have been astonished and confused. The dominant perception across the political spectrum was that Iraq was not a serious threat.” In fact, right through the 1990s, Israel showed little interest in the dossier some Americans busily compiled against Saddam. Laurie Mylroie, who argued that Saddam sponsored every act of terror everywhere, and possessed every kind of WMD, got little traction in Israel, and it frustrated her to no end:
Many Israelis [wrote Mylroie in 1998] refuse to accept and incorporate, even now, the information that suggests the US did not win the [1991 Kuwait] war and Saddam remains very dangerous. A few do—like Ehud Ya’ari/Ze’ev Schiff/Gerald Steinberg, Bar Ilan University/the editors of the Jerusalem Post. But most do not and their work is so systematically distorted that it is fit for little more than wrapping fish.
Mylroie thought Israel far too fixated on Iran, and called its unwillingness to prioritize Iraq “a strategic intelligence failure…not less than the strategic intelligence failure that preceded the Yom Kippur War.”
In November 2001, Seymour Hersh (in an article entitled “The Iran Game”) reported Israel’s concern that the post-9/11 “war on terror” had diverted U.S. attention from Iran, even as Iran accelerated its nuclear program. Hersh wrote that “even Israel’s most skeptical critics in the American intelligence community—and there are many—now acknowledge that there is a serious problem.” But the Bush administration put Israel off with assurances that it would get to Iran later. Hersh:
The Bush Administration continues to concentrate on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. “It’s more important to deal with Iraq than with Iran, because there’s nothing going on in Iraq that’s going to get better,” a senior Administration strategist told me. “In Iran, the people are openly defying the government. There’s some hope that Iran will get better. But there’s nothing in Iraq that gives you any hope, because Saddam rules so ruthlessly. What will we do if he provides anthrax to four guys in Al Qaeda?” He said, “If Iraq is out of the picture, we will concentrate on Iran in an entirely different way.”
In February 2002, ahead of a visit by Ariel Sharon to Washington, the Washington Post carried a story by Alan Sipress under the headline: “Israel Emphasizes Iranian Threat.”
As Prime Minister Ariel Sharon arrives today for a White House visit, Israeli officials are redoubling efforts to warn the Bush administration that Iran poses a greater threat than the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein.
A series of Israeli leaders have carried that message to Washington recently in the hope of influencing a debate that has centered not on Iran but on whether to pursue the overthrow of the Iraqi government.
The article went on to quote Israeli defense minister Fouad Ben-Eliezer: “Today, everybody is busy with Iraq. Iraq is a problem…. But you should understand, if you ask me, today Iran is more dangerous than Iraq.” The article added: “Though Israeli officials have few kind words for Saddam Hussein, they see him posing less of a threat than Iran after more than a decade of U.N. sanctions and international isolation.”
But the wheels of war in Washington continued to grind through spring and summer, and as they did, allies of the United States jumped on board. Even so, Israel still wasn’t entirely on the same page as the Bush administration. On October 6, 2002, James Bennet filed a story from Jerusalem that ran the next day under this headline: “Sharon Tells Cabinet to Keep Quiet on U.S. Plans” for Iraq. Bennet reported that Sharon had instructed his ministers to stop talking about Iraq, and then summarized the opinions of the military echelon:
Even as Mr. Bush has sought in recent days to play up the imminence and potency of the Iraqi threat, some of Israel’s top security officials have played both down.
Lt. Gen. Moshe Yaalon, Israel’s chief of staff, was quoted in the newspaper Maariv today as telling a trade group in a speech over the weekend, “I’m not losing any sleep over the Iraqi threat.” The reason, he said, was that the military strength of Israel and Iraq had diverged so sharply in the last decade.
Israel’s chief of military intelligence, Maj. Gen. Aharon Farkash, disputed contentions that Iraq was 18 months away from nuclear capability. In an interview on Saturday with Israeli television, he said army intelligence had concluded that Iraq’s time frame was more like four years, and he said Iran’s nuclear threat was as great as Iraq’s.
General Farkash also said Iraq had grown militarily weaker since the Persian Gulf war in 1991 and had not deployed any missiles that could strike Israel.
On October 16, 2002, the Los Angeles Times ran a front-page story by its Israel correspondent, Barbara Demick, under this headline: “Not All Israelis Welcome Prospect of War With Iraq.”
A muted debate is underway here over whether a U.S.-led war against Israel’s archenemy Saddam Hussein is, in fact, a good idea.
While it is widely assumed that Israelis are gloating over the prospect of Hussein getting his comeuppance after the Persian Gulf War, when 39 Iraqi Scud missiles rained down on Israel, the reality is far more complex and the reactions more ambivalent.
No doubt Israelis more than almost anyone would prefer a Middle East without Hussein, but some question whether the status quo of a weakened and contained Iraq isn’t better than a war that could further inflame anti-Israel sentiments in the Arab world.
Demick also quoted Generals Yaalon and Farkash, adding that “Israeli military specialists have been debating for several years whether Iraq or Iran poses more of a threat. Most specialists believe it is Iran, because it is richer and has been more directly implicated in international terrorism.” And she also had an explanation for the muted tone of the debate: “Those most enthusiastic about Washington’s campaign dread any suggestion that Israel is egging on the U.S. And those with misgivings are loath to say anything that might embarrass Israel’s most steadfast ally.”
Incredibly, Mearsheimer and Walt, in their section on “Israel and the Iraq War,” don’t cite Mylroie, or the articles in the Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Los Angeles Times. (The Washington Post piece is cited later, but in the wrong context. Mearsheimer and Walt chronologically misplace Ben-Eliezer’s remark, about Iran being more dangerous than Iraq. They date it to “one month before the Iraq war”—in other words, in the context of the debate over what should be done after Iraq. In fact, Ben-Eliezer made the statement one year and one month before the Iraq war, in the context of the debate about whether to do Iraq at all.)
In their analysis of Israeli public opinion, Mearsheimer and Walt also skip over evidence. They quote a September 2002 Wall Street Journal op-ed by Benjamin Netanyahu (then on the political sidelines) in which he made this assertion: “I believe I speak for the overwhelming majority of Israelis in supporting a pre-emptive strike against Saddam’s regime.” Mearsheimer and Walt:
As Netanyahu suggests, the desire for war was not confined to Israel’s leaders. Apart from Kuwait, which Saddam conquered in 1990, Israel was the only country in the world where both the politicians and the public enthusiastically favored war.
They then support this claim in a footnote, citing a February 2003 poll done by the Steinmatz Center at Tel Aviv University. It showed that 77.5 percent of Israeli Jews favored a U.S. campaign against Iraq.
But that wasn’t the only poll taken at the time. Mearsheimer and Walt could have consulted a more Iraq-specific poll cited by Gideon Levy, the far-left Haaretz columnist who opposed the war, and whom they quote as an authority on the hawkish mood of Israel’s leaders. In fact, Levy held that while Israel’s leaders favored a war, Israel’s public didn’t. Levy cited an opinion poll done by the Dialogue Institute for Haaretz and published in the paper on February 13, 2003:
It turns out that nearly half of Israelis are against an immediate war—20.4 percent think the U.S. should refrain completely from attacking, and another 23.4 percent are in favor of an attack only if all the inspection and mediation efforts fail. Figures in America are amazingly similar.
This hardly conforms to Mearsheimer and Walt’s assertion that “the [Israeli] public enthusiastically favored war.” Yet they fail to mention this major public opinion poll on the subject of their research, conducted for Haaretz—a newspaper cited almost ninety times in their footnotes. Instead they trot out a more convenient poll, and allow the argument to be clinched by Netanyahu. “I believe I speak for the overwhelming majority of Israelis,” he is quoted as claiming. Now when did he last do that?
What does the full evidence suggest? That the Israeli posture on the Iraq war was far more complex than Mearsheimer and Walt allow or even imagine. Did two former Israeli prime ministers, Barak and Netanyahu, write tough-guy op-eds in favor of striking Iraq? They did. Did ex-Mossad head Efraim Halevy give a starry-eyed speech on the new Middle East that would emerge after Saddam fell? He did. Did Israeli intelligence generate some overwrought assessments of Iraq? It did. But Israel also had a debate, one that’s gone missing in the Mearsheimer-Walt version.
Daniel Levy, an Israeli promoter of the so-called “Geneva Initiative,” grabbed some attention by welcoming the Mearsheimer-Walt paper. He can hardly be described as hostile to their enterprise. But in a radio interview, he said this:
I’ll give you an Israeli angle on this which may surprise some people and be interesting…. Many Israelis felt that engaging in a war with Iraq was the right thing to do and was good for Israeli security. However, there was a debate, it didn’t surface greatly but it was very much taking place within the Israeli security establishment and it said the following: the strategic threat is Iran, not Iraq. We may limit and actually undermine what we can do in Iran if we go for what some people have called the wrong war. Now those voices may not have been heard very publicly but they were heard inside the security establishment.
As we’ve seen, the Israelis also engaged the Americans in some measure of debate, and evidence for it even surfaced in the mainstream media. In a post-war analysis, Israeli analyst (and former general) Shlomo Brom described the disagreement—and what ended it (emphasis mine):
The ongoing dialogues between various levels of the Israeli and American governments over the last decade revealed disagreements between the two countries concerning the relative weight of the various threats in the Middle East. The United States was wont to emphasize the Iraqi threat, while Israel tended to express its understanding that the Iraqi threat was contained and under control, and it was the Iranian threat that loomed as far more serious. Once the Bush administration decided to take action against Iraq, it was more difficult for Israel to maintain its position that dealing with Iraq was not the highest priority, especially when it was obvious that the war would serve Israel’s interests. Considering the circumstances, it would therefore be difficult to expect the Israeli government to express its doubts—if any—about Iraq’s capabilities.
In fact, some doubts continued to leak into statements by Israel’s top generals. But once Israel’s leaders realized that the Bush administration was dead serious about ousting Saddam, they clambered onto the bandwagon. Israeli politicans joined the chorus, and the Israeli security establishment fell in line.
Mearsheimer and Walt thus would seem to have it exactly wrong. It wasn’t Israel that persuaded the Bush administration of the war’s necessity, but vice versa: the administration persuaded and then enlisted Israel. It did so, in considerable measure, by implying that the United States would be better positioned to deal with Iran once it had disposed of Saddam.
In the end, Israel acquiesced in the U.S. threat perception, which didn’t align with its own. Influential Israelis also publicly helped to bolster the arguments made by the Bush administration. As in 1990-91, Israel again prepared to do something totally foreign to it: to absorb an Iraqi strike, perhaps with non-conventional weapons, while forgoing retaliation. And during the war, Israel showed exceptional restraint toward the Palestinians. Not for a moment did it contemplate mass expulsion of Palestinians under the cover of war in Iraq—something Mearsheimer, in a display of true ignorance, thought quite possible at the time.
In short, Israel performed as an ideal ally and perfect client. Over the decades, this is precisely how Israel has built its credibility in Washington and across America—not through the machinations of the “Lobby.”
At Sandstorm, I’ve performed a detailed debunking of a key claim made by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt in their execrable paper, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy.” There they assert that Israel “pressured” the United States to attack Iraq, and that Israeli pressure was a “critical element” in the Bush administration’s decision to go to war. I bring counter-evidence. We report, you decide.
By the way, Mearsheimer and Walt were not the first prominent academics to make that claim. Juan Cole takes pride of place. This is perhaps his crudest statement of the case:
In the build-up to the Iraq War, [Douglas] Feith had a phalanx of Israeli generals visiting him in the Pentagon and ignored post-9/11 requirements that they sign in. Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was a vocal advocate of a US war against Iraq, who “put pressure” on Washington about it. (If Sharon wanted a war against Iraq, why didn’t he fight it himself instead of pushing it off on American boys?)
The illogic, the immoderation, the barely-concealed bigotry of this passage, show Cole at his darkest. He wants to be a Yale professor. You can spew these sorts of things after you break into the big three (e.g., Walt). But if you’ve said them before well, you’re an embarrassment just waiting to happen. Cole’s been lying low in the Mearsheimer-Walt flap. But have no doubt, Yale: he’s one of them.
Update: Since I posted this, Cole has showed himself, in a piece that exalts the Mearsheimer/Walt “study.” He’s definitely one of them.
One of the nuttiest passages in “The Israel Lobby,” the co-production of professors Stephen Walt (Harvard) and John Mearsheimer (University of Chicago), occurs in the very first footnote. (It’s in the full version, on the website of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.)
Indeed, the mere existence of the [pro-Israel] Lobby suggests that unconditional support for Israel is not in the American national interest. If it was, one would not need an organized special interest group to bring it about. But because Israel is a strategic and moral liability, it takes relentless political pressure to keep U.S. support intact.
Other commentators have pointed to the absurdity of this statement, since every conceivable special interest has a lobby in Washington, and they can’t all be working against the national interest. “By that standard,” writes Max Boot, ”Social Security, the 2nd Amendment and Roe vs. Wade must not be ‘in the American national interest’ either, because they are all defended by even more powerful lobbies.” Caroline Glick hits even harder:
Every semi-sentient person with even an incidental knowledge of American politics knows that there is no area of human endeavor that is not represented by a lobby in the US. Walt and Mearsheimer’s asinine assertion means is that every American interest group–from the elderly to the insurance industry, from the Muslims to gun owners to organic food lovers–stands opposed to the American national interest simply by existing. Any professor who made a similar assertion about any other interest group would be imperiling his career.
You can be absolutely sure no professor will make that assertion about one of the most powerful lobbies in Washington: the higher education lobby.
Start with Harvard’s own Office of Federal Relations, conveniently described on its own website. There we learn the following: “Harvard’s federal relations teams in Cambridge and Washington, D.C. work to maintain a positive and ongoing relationship between Harvard and the Congressional and Executive branches of government.”
There you have it, Professor Walt! Evidence that federal support for Harvard is not in the American national interest! If it was, Harvard would not need federal relations “teams” operating out of Cambridge and Washington to bring it about. But because so many Harvard professors are intellectual and moral liabilities, it takes relentless political pressure to keep federal support intact.
Even if Harvard is sitting on a $26 billion endowment, and collecting tens of millions from Saudi princes, it still needs your money. But it’s not just Harvard. Every major research university, and lots of lesser ones, have offices of “government relations”–in-house lobbies that often keep branches in Washington. The downtown Washington office of the University of California, the largest, has a professional staff of twelve. Universities also contract K Street lobbyists when they need them. For example, the Chicago Tribune reported in January that the University of Chicago has hired the Federalist Group, a Washington lobbying firm, to help it win what is supposed to be a merit-based competition to manage the Argonne National Laboratory. The university is applying political pressure to preserve its established hold on the laboratory. What say you, Professor Mearsheimer?
Beyond the lobbying efforts of individual institutions, there’s an alphabet soup of about fifty Washington-based higher ed organizations, led by the mighty American Council on Education (ACE). “There’s a virtual armada of professional educational lobbyists who, more often than not, move in lock step to preserve the status quo,” the spokesman of the House education committee reports. The universities’ main game is to raise tuition faster than inflation, and then get the taxpayers to foot the bill through student aid, mostly in loans ($90 billion in federal money last year). According to the College Board, the overall tuition and fees at private four-year schools in the United States rose an average annual rate of 5.8 percent from 2001 to 2006. If you paid that, or graduated with a mountain of debt, thank the higher ed lobby.
What would happen if you ran the higher ed lobby against the pro-Israel lobby, in a battle of the titans? Walt and Mearsheimer criticize “the efforts Jewish groups have made to push Congress into establishing mechanisms to monitor what professors say. If they manage to get this passed, universities judged to have an anti-Israel bias would be denied federal funding. Their efforts have not yet succeeded, but they are an indication of the importance placed on controlling debate.”
That’s a lie. There is no Jewish-inspired mechanism being “pushed” on Congress that would monitor what professors say or punish anti-Israel bias. There is a Republican-led effort to get something back from area studies programs that suck subsidies out of Washington. I can testify, from first-hand knowledge, that most Jewish organizations haven’t and won’t go up to the Hill to support that effort. They’re not absolutely sure the reform will do anything for Israel, and they have an innate fear of confronting the higher ed lobby.
Why? First, the higher ed crowd will accuse you of McCarthyism on the slightest pretext, and Jewish organizations are super-sensitive to that. Second, within living memory, America’s great universities limited the access of Jews, so Jewish organizations don’t want to rock the boat. If any reform of these programs passes, it’ll be thanks to conservative Republican congressmen who are fed up with the way liberal-left academe stiffs them on area studies. They want to see some grads come out of these programs who really know difficult languages and are willing to sign on for national service. Benefit to America? Potentially immense. Benefit to Israel? Not obvious.
In conclusion: If we accept Walt and Mearsheimer’s claim that a lobby, by definition, works against the national interest, then this must be equally true of the Harvard lobby, the University of Chicago lobby, and the entire higher ed lobby, all of which work for them. There might even be some evidence for such a determination: tuitions rise everywhere and so do taxpayer subsidies, yet nonsense pervades the faculties of America’s greatest universities. Still, it would be foolish to argue that universities are conspiring against the rest of us. It’s just the American way. And if it weren’t for lobbies (and their cousins, think tanks), Washington would be a city short on ideas. We’d be left to rely on uneven if not shoddy “scholarship” that’s dogmatic, one-dimensional and simplistic. “The Israel Lobby” is a case in point.
I’m disappointed with the short shrift I got in “The Israel Lobby” by John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt. I’m mentioned, but in error:
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September 2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately pro-Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that posted dossiers on suspect academics and encouraged studies to report comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel. This transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed the dossiers, but the website still invites studies to report alleged anti-Israel behavior at U.S. colleges.
As Pipes has pointed out in a correction, “Martin Kramer had no role in founding Campus Watch.” I also clarified that fact when Pipes launched his site, since some people openly assumed I had to be behind it. (I did endorse Campus Watch, and still think all the whining about it is just so much… whining.) I guess Mearsheimer and Walt didn’t do their homework, or relied on sloppy grad students to do their “research.” (It’s a Harvard tradition.)
But surely I deserve condemnation for my book Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America? The Washington Institute for Near East Policy published it a year before Campus Watch. “The Israel Lobby” is loaded with fat footnotes, many of them referencing journalistic junk, so it would have raised the overall level to have cited my book. Well, I take some comfort in the fact that it’s just a working paper, so maybe they’ll fix the mistake and rectify the omission. I’ll have the publisher send them copies with this entry.
P.S. to John and Steve: I am a sorry excuse for a neoconservative.
Addendum: The Campus Watch error is repeated in an otherwise sensible article by French analyst Justin Vaïsse in Libération. Sloppy.
Update: Justin Vaïsse has had the error noted and corrected in the online article. I am grateful to him.